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ABSTRACT
This document describes the KX.509 protocol. Using this protocol, a
workstation can acquire a temporary (or ‘‘junk’’) X.509 certificate on behalf of a user
based on having a kerberos ticket for that user.
1. The Big Picture
In normal use, running kx509 will be an invisible phase of the login process. During ‘‘login’’, the user
will supply a password, which will never leave the workstation. The password is used to acquire a K4
ticket granting ticket (TGT), then scrubbed from memory. Once the TGT is acquired by ‘‘login’’,
kx509 starts. First, kx509 generates a RSA public/private key-pair. Next, using the TGT it acquires a
Kerberos service ticket for the KCA (Kerberized Certificate Authority), and uses this to send the public
half of its key-pair. The KCA will decrypt the service ticket, verify the integrity of the incoming
packet, determine the identity of the user, and use the session key to send back a short-lived X.509
certificate. If all goes well, kx509 then stores the certificate and key-pair in the local certificate cache.
The full picture looks something like this:
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The protocol that is described in this document refers to the lines labelled (f) and (g) in the above
picture. This section provides the background needed to understand the roles of kx509 and the KCA.
The remainder of this document will concentrate on (f) and (g), the actual protocol. Additional
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documentation (not yet written) will describe other aspects of this big picture.
On MicroSoft Windows machines, the X.509 certificate is stored in the registry. Web browsers under
Windows already know how to get at certificates stored in the registry. Under UNIX, the certificate and
key pair are stored as a special entry in the kerberos ticket cache. For Unix and the Macintosh, a
pkcs11 shared library is provided that allows the web browser to get at the certificate. This entire
process should be invisible to normal users, who will only know what they need to supply their
password only once (‘‘single-sign-on,’’) and that this suffices to enable their web browser to identify
them to remote services.
A mechanism should be provided to erase the private keys and certificates gotten by kx509 between user
login sessions or upon request by the user. Ideally, kx509 certificates and key pairs should be destroyed
whenever the kerberos ticket cache is destroyed or recreated.
2. The Protocol
kx509 uses UDP to talk to the kerberos certificate authority. The request packet contains a protocol
version identifier, a kerberos 4 ap request, integrity check data on the request, and a public key
generated by kx509. The response packet contains a protocol version identifier, and may contain one or
more of an error code, integrity check data on the response, a certificate, and an error message.
The KCA needs to have a kerberos service identity. This identity is always cert.x509@@REALM.
The identity cert.kx509@@REALM is also reserved, but not used in the protocol exchange. Some
implementations of kx509 use the kerberos-4 ticket cache as the certificate cache, and store the
certificate as a ‘‘pseudo-ticket’’ under this identity. The KCA is expected to be run on the kerberos
database machines. kx509 client implementations may supply a mechanism to specify the use of an
alternate kerberos service identity or KCA hosts, for debugging purposes.
Let v = the version string, the first 4 bytes of the resquest or response,
c = the client’s identity,
and q = the KCA.
EK (P ) denotes encryption by key K of P ,
K q, the key of KCA,
K c,q, the session key,
T c,q=q ,EKq (c ,ipaddr,start,K c,q), a kerberos ticket,
a =A c,q=EK
c,q
(c ,ipaddr,t ),EKq (T c,q), the kerberos 4 authenticator,
and p = a public key generated by the client.
The packet described by (f) in the big picture, which goes from kx509 to KCA, is a request. It
contains
v version
a kerberos ap req
HMACK
c,q
(v ,p ) check data
p public key
The packet described by (g) in the big picture, which goes from the KCA back to kx509, is a
response. It contains
v version string
s error code
HMACK
c,q
(v ,x ,e ,s ) check data
x x.509 certificate
e error message
The only encrypted information in the protocol is that used by kerberos itself; the public key and
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certificate are transmitted in the clear and HMAC-SHA-1 is used for data integrity checking.
3. Secure Hash Algorithm
HMAC is described in [HMAC]. SHA-1 [SHA] is used for the underlying hash algorithm. All 160 bits
are sent. Some uses of HMAC use a truncated version of the hash, this is done when date to be hashed
has a predictable, but secret value, to make it harder to guess the data. In this case, the data is easy to
predict (as it’s been sent in the clear in the same packet), so there is no reason to dicard any hash
information.
4. Protocol Version Numbers
The first 4 bytes of the packet contain version identifying information. The first two bytes of data are
reserved. They should be set to 0 when sent, and should be ignored when received. The 3rd byte is the
protocol version major number, and the 4th byte is the protocol version minor number. The version of
the protocol described in this document is 2.0, which is expressed with the bytes 2, 0. So, a full header
of all 2.0 packets should be set to look like this:
_ ______________________
0 0 2 0 ...
_ ______________________      
It is expected that the major number should be stepped for incompatible changes in the protocol, and the
minor number may be stepped for compatible minor changes in the protocol. A server that receives a
packet with a supported major.minor # should attempt to return the exact same version if possible,
otherwise it may return a packet with the same major number and a different minor number. In general,
clients are only expected to support one protocol version, but may implement an option selected at
compile-time or run-time to select a different protocol version. Clients should accept packets that match
the same major number as the request, and refuse to process packets with a different major number than
the request.
Protocol version 1.0 is not secure, and should not be used except for testing purposes. Production
servers should never support version 1.0.
5. ASN.1 Packet Data Structure
The remainder of the packet is packed using DER, which can be described as follows using ASN.1.
-- kx509
KX509 DEFINITIONS ::=
BEGIN
kx509Request ::= SEQUENCE {
ap-req OCTET STRING,
pk-hash OCTET STRING,
pk-key OCTET STRING
}
kx509Response ::= SEQUENCE {
error-code[0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
hash[1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
certificate[2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
e-text[3] VisibleString OPTIONAL
}
END
An error decoding the request or response packet indicates that that particular packet was corrupted, and
should be ignored. The server should not return any sort of packet in the case of a malformed request.
Both request and response packets are prefixed with a 4-byte version string, which is not part of the
ASN.1 data structure. Not all combinations of optional data in the response make sense. The legal
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combinations, and their interpretation, are described later.
6. The Request Packet
The request contains a number of objects that may themselves be DER encoded, stored as opaque
vectors using the ASN.1 data type OCTET STRING. The reason to handle things this way is to ensure
that they can be passed as byte strings of definite length to hash functions, before any further
interpretion is made of them by the local ASN.1 library.
The ap-req is a kerberos 4 application request, as made by the routine krb_mk_req in the
kerberos-4 library. The application request includes cleartext information needed by krb_rd_req to
locate the correct service key, the ticket encrypted by the KCA kerberos-4 service key, and request
information encrypted under the session key. The first byte of the application request is always
KRB_PROT_VERSION (4), and the second byte is always AUTH_MSG_APPL_REQUEST 
HOST_BYTE_ORDER (6 or 7). Future versions of KCA may support kerberos-5 style application
requests. It is believed that kerberos-5 style application requests can be uniquely distinguished from
kerberos-4 by inspecting the first bytes. The application request also includes a 32-bit ‘‘checksum’’
computed by the sender. This checksum is not checked or used by KCA. It may be set to any constant
or random value. If it is set to a random value, care should be taken that it does not leak any secret
information from the client machine, including state information used to construct the private/public
keypair.
The pk-hash is an octet-string containing the 20 byte SHA-1 HMAC of the request. SHA-1 is
described in FIPS PUB 180-1. HMAC is described in RFC 2104 and RFC 2202. The key used is the
session key. Kerberos 4 session keys are always 8 bytes. Kerberos 5 session keys may be of other
lengths. The data passed to SHA-1 contists of the 4-byte version string at the start of the packet and the
octet string for pk-key.
The pk-key is an octet string containing a public key. This key and its corresponding private key are
generated locally by the kx509 client before the server is contacted. The public key is converted to
DER representation and this is then stored in an octet-string in the request.
7. Handling the Request
When the server receives a request, it may make several sanity checks on the request. This includes
checking to see if the application request can be decoded, verifying the hash on the request, and
imposing a minimum length or other simple sanity checks on the public key. If the application request
cannot be decoded, the server may choose to return an unauthentic error response with a status code and
error message, but no hash or certificate. The server should contain logic to limit the number of
unauthentic errors that can be returned in a given time. If there are no errors in the application request
(lifetime within bounds, etc.) the server should always supply a hash on the response packet.
8. The Response Packet
The response contains a number of objects that are optional. Although the actual wire protocol makes
no distinction as to which are present and which are not, there are definite logical rules the server and
client should respect as to which fields should or should not be present. The server SHOULD NOT
transmit a zero error-code. The client MUST treat a missing error-code as if it were 0. The
following cases are possible for responses:
1 certificate hash
2 error-code error-message hash
3 error-code error-message
The first case is returned when the server successfully generates a certificate for the user.
The 2nd case is returned when the server is able to successfully authenticate the user and extract the
session key, but is unable for some reason to generate a certificate.
The 3rd case is allowed if the server is unable to successfully authenticate the user, and is intended to
allow the server to return useful but unauthenticated information to the user. (Currently, if the KCA
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sanity check fails, the client times out and receives no error-code nor error-message).
The error-code should be treated as an unsigned 32-bit integer and only the non-zero bytes, in
network byte order (most significant byte first) should be processed. Some implementations of ASN.1
may pass very large 32-bit unsigned integers as negative integers; for the purpose of computing the hash
the client should ignore any such bogus indication.
The hash on a response is computed using SHA-1 HMAC, as for the request. The data that is passed
to this function includes, in order: the 4-byte version string at the start of the packet, the error-code
if present, certificate if present, and error-message if present.
The certificate is the DER encoded representation of the certificate. It is then encapsulated as an
opaque vector in the actual packet sent to facilitate computing the hash before unwrapping the
certificate.
The error-message is sent as a VisibleString instead of a OCTET-STRING because of its
special interpretation as containing printable characters. If the client machine does not use the ASCII
character set, it may wish to translate this error message into a different character set. If it does so, the
hash function described above MUST be done before the translation. The error message, as shipped,
SHOULD NOT contain any NUL characters. The client MUST be capable of properly processing an
error message returned without a trailing NUL. The client MAY ignore any part of the error message
after the first NUL character for display purposes. The client MUST process the entire error-
message, including any buried NUL characters, when computing the hash.
9. Interpresting Optional Data in kx509 Responses
If the response contains a certificate, it must contain a hash. If the hash is missing, a protocol error has
occurred. The client should continue to look for a valid packet, but may report that a protocol error has
occured if no valid packet is received, as described below. A response with a certificate should not
contain an error-code, but if it does, the error-code must be zero. A response with a certificate may
contain an error message. The error message must be considered in the hash calculation, but may be
otherwise ignored. Client implementations may choose to treat the error message in a response with a
valid certificate and hash as informational text and display it, if this is appropriate.
If the response does not contain a certificate, it must contain an error message and a non-zero error code.
In this case, a zero error code is a protocol error, and a missing error message is a protocol error. Error
messages may contain a hash. If the hash is there, the client should check it, and if the hash does not
check out, a protocol error has occurred. An error message with a non-zero error code and a valid hash
should be regarded as authoritative for that server, and the client should not send any additional requests
to that server. The client may continue to attempt to do further retries for other servers in the same
domain.
In case of a protocol error, the client should always regard the packet as an unauthentic error. When
reporting such packets, the client should report the protocol error, and may accompany this report with
diagnostic information from the packet. An error message without a valid hash, or upon which a
protocol error has occurred, is not authoritative. If no such packet is received, the client should report
the error contained in the first unauthentic error response received, and may note that the error message
is not authenticate.
10. Areas for Further Research
1. The hash on the request does not include the authenticator. Should it?
2. Should the checksum in the kerberos-4 ap_req be better used?
3. The use of numbered tags for the ASN.1 reply, but not in the request, is weird.
4. It has been suggested that the KCA ought to be willing to supply its public certificate as well.
Does this mean it would be useful to have 2 kinds of requests? Would it be useful if requests had
an op-code field?
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